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ABSTRACT Increasing demands for high-speed broadband wireless communications with voice over long
term evolution (LTE), video on demand, multimedia, andmission-critical applications for public safety moti-
vate 4th-generation (4G) and 5G communication development. The flat IP-based LTE and LTE-Advanced
technologies are the expected key drivers for 5G. However, LTE, with its elapsed security mechanism and
open nature, leaves a huge loophole for intruders to jeopardize the entire communication network. The time-
and bandwidth-consuming authentication procedure in LTE leads to service disruptions and makes it unfit
for public safety applications. To cater the prevailing LTE security and service requirements, we propose the
4G plus relative authentication model (4G+RAM), which is composed of two dependent protocols:
1) Privacy-protected evolved packet system authentication and key agreement protocol for the initial authen-
tication (PEPS-AKA) and 2) 4G plus frequency-based re-authentication protocol for the re-authentication of
known and frequent users (4G+FRP). The 4G+RAM supports seamless communication with a minimum
signaling load on core elements and conceals users’ permanent identifiers to ensure user privacy.We simulate
the proposed protocols for formal security verification with the widely accepted automated validation of
Internet security protocols and applications tool. A comparative analysis of bandwidth consumption is also
performed and proved that the proposed 4G+RAM outperforms the existing solutions.
INDEX TERMS Authentication overhead, dynamic LTE key, EPS-AKA, IMSI-protection, LTE, public
safety, re-authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION TO LTE AND PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES
The currently used high-resolution mobile devices such as
smartphones and laptops evolved from monochrome devices
with low processing capabilities. These smartphones and
laptops with high processing capabilities, coupled with
a scalable cache of the bandwidth-hungry applications,
demand higher data rates and produce better user expe-
riences. The key feature of the 4th-Generation (4G) net-
work is its ability to support peak downlink data rates of
upto1GB/sec. The amount of mobile data is forecasted to
grow more than 500-fold by 2020, and this has propelled
the worldwide 4G deployment [1]. Long-Term Evolution
(LTE - release 11) and LTE-Advanced (LTE-A - releases 12
and beyond) are the major 4G wireless communication tech-
nologies that are recommended by the 3rd-Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP). The 3GPP 4G technologies aim
to satisfy the growing user needs for voice over IP, video
on demand, and evolving Internet applications and service
requirements. LTE remains highly significant and will con-
tinue to evolve to achieve the goal of a 5G network as a
commercial reality [2].
LTE and LTE-A are likely to evolve in the 5G era as
LTE radio access technology becomes accessible to 5G
devices [3]. Therefore, LTE and LTE-A cellular networks
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can render services to future generation 5G devices. Indeed,
cellular networks have established footprints worldwide and
can address the challenges of ubiquitous networks. Addi-
tionally, the future 5G technology depends on the Infor-
mation and Communication Technology (ICT) ecosystem,
which is essential for business, commercial needs, and Pub-
lic Safety (PS); in turn, its growth depends on the global
success of LTE. LTE broadband communication is gaining
importance in emergency and rescue operations, where voice
calls will remain an essential service, even for PS systems.
These voice calls in PS systems rely on voice over LTE [4].
PS communication security is of paramount importance in
public safety LTE (PS-LTE) networks, which includes con-
fidentiality, authentication and user privacy management [5].
Furthermore, with the increasing demands for information
security and privacy in daily life and businesses, the success
of the PS-LTE depends on its security and service level [6].
II. LTE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
Whenever a user device tries to access a network such as LTE,
the authentication process is triggered. The subscriber and
access networks’ mutual authentication function in the LTE
evolved packet system follows the Evolved Packet System
Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) protocol,
in which the authentication server validate the subscriber’s
credentials at the core network to provide the requested access
and the network is authenticated by the user’s device. Accord-
ing to the EPS-AKA protocol, the subscribers’ device must
perform a complete authentication process with the access
network irrespective of their access frequency, which leads
to intolerable signaling overhead and service failure.
The accessibility of the LTE network to 5G devices with
low latency requirements will affect its Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS); the impact will be especially detrimental for
LTE-dependent PS services. Additionally, EPS-AKA suffers
from several vulnerabilities, such as disclosure of user iden-
tity, man-in-the-middle attack, Authentication Vector (AV)
synchronization failure, high computational overhead and
authentication delays [7], [8]. LTE and LTE-A, as flat
IP-based architectures, are vulnerable to injection attack,
modification attack on user plane traffic and more pri-
vacy attacks than UMTS and GSM networks [9], [10].
In EPS-AKA process, the attach request message sent by
the User Equipment (UE) to the Mobility Management
Entity (MME) and the authentication request message sent
by the MME to the UE are sent unencrypted. This is the main
reason for the open nature and security vulnerabilities in LTE.
The unencrypted attach request message containing the
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a major
threat to user privacy and safety. IMSI catchers act as fake
base stations that can cache the subscriber IMSIs that are
sent on air during the authentication process [9]. Stingray and
Trigger fish are two major technologies that are used to track
subscribers and their IMSIs legally [11]. These technologies
can do more than tracking: during the ongoing VoIP services,
the callers and speakers, the time of the call, and the location
FIGURE 1. LTE key hierarchy.
from where the call initiated can also be identified. Stingray
acts as a rogue base station that triggers the UE to initiate a
communication through it. Once a successful communication
is established, the rogue base station can capture the entire
conversation with its technology. Triggerfish is a technol-
ogy that can foresee the communication scenario for spying
with its intelligence. These technologies in the hands of any
intruder will be dangerous tomobile users’ privacy and safety.
These are themajor critical issues that require urgent attention
from researchers.
According to 3GPP TS 33.401, the entire key hierar-
chy is derived from the static key, LTE K, as shown in
Figure 1. The Cipher Key (CK), Integrity Key (IK), Security
master key (KASME), Non-Access Stratum (NAS) signal-
ing encryption and integrity keys (KNASenc, KNASint), Radio
Resource Control (RRC) signaling encryption and integrity
keys (KRRCenc, KRRCint), and User plane encryption and
integrity keys (KUPenc, KUPint) are the set of keys derived from
the static LTEK. The Next hop (NH) key is the key derived by
UE andMME to ensure forward security andKeNB∗ is the key
derived by UE and eNB from the current KeNB or fresh NH
when performing a horizontal or vertical key derivation. The
MME holds KASME (the MME base key), and it is not shared
with the UE over direct transmission. This top-level key in
the hierarchy is received by the access security management
entity (ASME) from HSS and derived at the LTE user end
based on the AV parameters it receives from the MME during
the EPS-AKA authentication process. The MME is assumed
to act as an ASME in every LTE access network. If any
intruder compromises LTE K, then the entire LTE network
can be tampered with [12]. As a result, security is potentially
affected everywhere.
The proposed 4G+RAM with PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP
aims to achieve a better trade-off between security and
QoS. To prevent the sniffing of users’ permanent and tem-
porary identifiers, which has critical security implications
such as user tracking, user privacy, safety and reputation
threats, the entire authentication and the re-authentication
message exchange involving PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP are
protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity. Moreover,
service failures and degradation due to the time-consuming
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authentication procedure are significantly reduced by the
4G+FRP-based re-authentication. It ensures fast and seam-
less network access for LTE and PS-LTE users by avoid-
ing HSS involvement and minimizes signaling between UE
and network core elements. Overall, the 4G+RAM achieves
secure and seamless communication for LTE and its depen-
dent PS-LTE end users. No other significant research con-
tribution has yet been made to PS-LTE security. Hence, this
research work will be a thoughtful initiative that discusses the
LTE enhancements to support 5G and PS services.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section III
presents a brief summary of the work related to LTE authen-
tication and the security mechanism. Section IV presents
the preliminaries that highlight the significant contribu-
tion of the proposed 4G+RAM for LTE and its dependent
next-generation PS networks. Section V elaborates the pro-
posed 4G+RAM with PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP. Section VI
presents a performance analysis based on the formal security
verification of the proposed schemes with the Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applica-
tions (AVISPA) tool and a comparative bandwidth consump-
tion analysis against the existing schemes. It is inferred that
the existing schemes that are considered in the comparative
study are not bandwidth efficient; hence, the comparative
analysis of the proposed systems is limited to authentication
bandwidth consumption. Section VII discusses the security
features of the proposed 4G+RAM framework, and finally,
the conclusion is drawn in Section VIII.
III. RELATED WORK
This section gives a brief outline of the security issues and
communication overhead issues in the LTE EPS-AKA as
well as the corresponding solutions proposed to date and
their shortcomings. Starting with the security issues related
to IMSI, a static user identity guarantees confidentiality in
an LTE access network. IMSI is necessary to clone any user.
To establish a secure connection, it is mandatory to avoid the
use of IMSI on air by replacing it with any other temporary
identity, which is called the Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identity (TMSI) [13]. In contrast, the authentication protocols
in recent research works transmit the unencrypted IMSI on
air during the initial attach request, which allows intruders to
tamper with the IMSI [9], [14]. Another major rising threat
is redirection attack, where a fake Evolved Node B (eNB)
redirects the user attach request to a foreign network when
a user is eligible or intends to connect to its home network.
In this case, the foreign network charges the mobile user
based on a rate that is higher than the rate offered by the home
network.
EPS Integrity algorithms (EIA), such as EIA1, EIA2, and
EIA3, are being used in LTE. EIA2 is preferred for integrity
protection in the proposed system as it utilizes AES as the
underlying cipher and Cipher-based Message Authentication
Code (CMAC) as the upper-level Message Authentication
Code (MAC) structure, which has been proven to be secure.
In contrast, EIA1 and EIA3 are polynomial MACs, which
have the linear property and are prone to linear forgery
attack and trace extension forgery attack [15], [16]. The
lack of forward secrecy and vulnerability to man-in-the-
middle attack are still security problems of LTE EPS-AKA,
as an unencrypted authentication procedure is carried out
between the UE and core network [9], [17], [18]. In the
future, LTE systems are envisioned to support critical PS
communication, where seamless communication between the
victims and responders in tactile and emergency scenarios is
required [5], [19].
Further, the issues related to authentication signaling and
processing overhead due to the larger number of AV gen-
erations are analyzed. When a UE sends an access request
to the LTE network in the EPS-AKA process, ‘n’ number
of AVs are generated and stored at the HSS. If the UE
does not stay within that access network any longer or if
the UE does not visit the same LTE access network in
the future, the stored AVs that correspond to the UE are
discarded by the HSS. This approach of AV generation at
the HSS without knowing the UE access frequency imposes
unnecessary overload at the HSS [9]. The UE bandwidth
consumption and authentication signaling overhead between
the serving network and home network lead to authentication
delay, which is one of the main problems in the existing
system. The service access request is authenticated using
the stored set of AVs and KASME without AKA execu-
tion. The in-sequence AV usage depends on the sequence
number management schemes. Usually, this approach leads
to re-synchronization problems due to the interleaving use
of AVs. Therefore, when an AV is used for authentication
shortly after its retrieval from theHSS, the re-synchronization
problem in the EPS system can be avoided [20].
Moreover, caching the AV set imposes huge storage over-
head in the UE and HSS. Additionally, if the authentica-
tion process for access provision depends completely on
a remote backend server such as the HSS/Authentication
Center (AuC), the access provision will be delayed and,
moreover, the network partition will always result in denial-
of-service attacks on the legitimate users. In the Ensure
Confidentiality Authentication and Key Agreement protocol,
many cryptographic operations are involved, which increases
the computational overhead and complexity of the authenti-
cation process. Moreover, ‘n’ AVs are created by the HSS for
use in future handovers, which is a burden to the HSS [21].
A few group-based and other solutions to minimize the
authentication overhead and signaling congestion in the
access network are discussed as follows. A group-based secu-
rity protocol for Machine Type Communication is proposed,
where the devices in a site are grouped to form a binary tree,
with a group leader, where a set of leaders are included among
other members to represent the group to the core network
for performing authentication. During multiple initiations to
avoid a collision, each leader waits for a random amount of
time before initiating the first message. This random waiting
process among the group leaders eventually increases the net-
work access time of the mobile user, which is intolerable [22].
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A Group-based Anonymity Handover Authentication Pro-
tocol scheme and a dynamic policy updating scheme for
LTE-A involve huge computational cost [23], [24].
An enhanced EPS-AKA (EEPS-AKA) scheme introduces a
one-way key function, predefined encryption function and a
unique key identifier to enhance LTE security. It claims that
for users possessing security context, authentication at the
serving network is enabled instead routing the authentication
process to the home network, thereby minimizing the com-
munication overhead. However, the major drawback of this
scheme is that the security context sharing process for the
mobile user has not been discussed [25].
The summarized research contributions are unable to
address the critical security and QoS requirements of the LTE
system. Therefore, the current time-consuming authentica-
tion in LTE and security flaws require an effective viable solu-
tion, such as the proposed 4G+RAM, to meet the growing
demands of the broadband communication ecosystem. When
LTE-A is considered, the proposed 4G+RAM authentication
model for LTE can be extended with minimummodifications
to work with LTE-A. Furthermore, as no vast changes to the
core LTE functionality are anticipated; the basic core security
mechanisms will continue to prevail in LTE-A. The only
change in LTE-A is to introduce relay nodes, and this work
is already underway. To support the proposed 4G+RAM
authentication framework, a set of function identifiers are
cached at the UE and MME ends. Caching the function iden-
tifiers does not impose any overhead on the MME, as it has
the capability to store the non-access stratum security context
during EPS Connection Management connected to EPS Con-
nection Management idle transitions. In LTE, the current key
size is 128 bits, and there is a wide possibility to extend the
key size to 256 bits in the future; therefore, LTE has the space
to evolve into a better ICT.
IV. PRELIMINARIES OF LTE-DEPENDENT PUBLIC
SAFETY NETWORK
Two separate technologies, such as cellular networks (LTE)
and PS networks, provide wide-area wireless communica-
tions. The exceptional success of LTE and its business impact
has led to rapid innovations. The critical PS network that
provides services for fire, police and ambulance was once
a standalone and dedicated network, which is expected to
function better, with enhancements to LTE [5]. Therefore,
the 3GPP is working to foster a common technology that can
render better service to both communities.
The PS standards, such as TETRA and P25, put forth
a set of features that were not supported by cellular sys-
tems [26]. Currently, 3GPP works on LTE-based prox-
imity services (TS 23.303) and the group call system for
PS (TS 23.468). The LTE-based network, with fast access
and seamless communication for PS, is considered the prime
factor in this research work. The underlying LTE architecture
remains the same, but the functionalities of the access and
core network entities need to be enhanced to support the PS
services. The proposed 4G+RAM-based access scenario is
FIGURE 2. 4G+RAM-based access scenario in LTE architecture.
depicted in Figure 2. The 4G+RAM aims to complement
seamless communication for critical PS services over LTE.
It clearly shows that, similar to the existing EPS-AKA,
the proposed initial PEPS-AKA-based authentication
involves message exchanges with UE, MME (through
eNB) and HSS, whereas the proposed 4G+FRP-based
re-authentication limits HSS involvement; this, in turn,
greatly reduces the network access time and HSS overload.
The authentication message exchanges of PEPS-AKA are
depicted as red lines in Figure 2, and the authentication pro-
cess flow from step 1 to step 6, is elaborated in Section V-A.
The re-authentication message exchanges of 4G+FRP are
depicted as green lines in Figure 2, and the re-authentication
process flow, which involves steps 1 and 2, is elaborated in
Section V-B.
The functions of the entities in the Evolved Universal
Terrestrial Access Network (E-UTRAN) and Evolved Packet
Core (EPC), shown in Figure 2, are briefly discussed as
follows.
User Equipment: The UE holds a Universal Integrated
Circuit Card with IMSI and Secret static LTE K. An LTE-Uu
interface connects UE with eNB.
eNodeB: The E-UTRAN handles the radio access commu-
nication between the UE and EPC with the eNodeB (also
known as eNB). An eNB is a base station that controls the
mobile UE in the nearby cells. An eNB communicating with
an active UE is known as a serving eNB. An eNB connects
to other eNBs using an X2 interface and to the EPS using an
S1 interface.
Home Subscriber Server: The HSS consists of the home
Location Register and the AuC subsystem. The HSS holds
a central database that manages all mobile subscriber infor-
mation for user registration, handover, authentication, autho-
rization, location updating, session routing, accounting, call
control and AV forwarding to the MME. The HSS and MME
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exchange subscription and authentication information using
an S6a interface.
The Serving Gateway: The S-GW acts as a router and
forwards the data from an eNB to the PDN gateway. The
S-GW connects to the P-GW using an S5 interface during
intra-LTE handover and using an S8 interface during LTE
interworking handover.
The Packet Data Network Gateway: The P-GW communi-
cates with the external world using an SGi interface. Here,
the packet data network may be an Internet or an intra-
operator packet data network for IP Multimedia Subsystem
service provision.
The Policy Control and Charging Rule Function: The
PCRF controls the flow-based charging functionalities in the
policy control enforcement function of the P-GW using a Gx
interface.
The Charging Gateway: The Charging-GW performs
event-based and session-based charging for LTE applica-
tions and services. The charging GW communicates with the
P-GW using Gy/Gz.
PRF Table: A PRF table with a set of PRFs needs to be
maintained at every UE, eNB and HSS to support the flawless
and efficient execution of the proposed 4G+RAM.
The merits of the proposed 4G+RAM are listed as follows.
1. Communication overhead due to transmission of the
huge AV set from the HSS to the UE can be sig-
nificantly reduced. Therefore, the AV synchronization
problem and cache overhead at UE, MME and HSS are
minimized.
2. The HSS is not involved in the re-authentication process
when 4G+FRP is used as an extension to the proposed
PEPS-AKA in 4G+RAM; hence, access delays in the
LTE and PS-LTE networks are minimized.
3. All attach requests and response messages that
are transmitted during the initial authentication and
re-authentication processes are ciphered and integrity
protected. Hence, 4G+RAM ensures protection against
user identity theft, tracking, man-in-the-middle, syn-
chronization, replay, denial-of-service (DoS),
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and redirection
attacks.
4. The dynamic LTE K generation ensures robust security
in AV and KASME generation.
5. 4G+RAM provides a seamless and secure connection
for the LTE network and its dependent critical PS net-
work users.
V. PROPOSED 4G+ RELATIVE AUTHENTICATION
MODEL: (4G+RAM)
In this section, the proposed 4G+RAMauthenticationmodel,
which resolves the problem of authentication latency and
the corresponding service failure, is discussed in detail.
Re-authentication is used to minimize authentication access
latency and ensures seamless communication. The 4G+RAM
process flow is shown in Figure 3. The 4G+RAM is com-
posed of two dependent authentication protocols: PEPS-AKA
FIGURE 3. 4G+RAM process flow.
and a low-latency 4G+FRP, which are used for authenti-
cation and re-authentication, respectively. The LTE users
are classified into three categories: new users, known users,
and frequent users. Every new user is authenticated with
the proposed PEPS-AKA protocol, and each known user
is authenticated initially with the PEPS-AKA protocol and
then re-authenticated with a 4G+FRP-based fast access
provision for one future network entry. Finally, the fre-
quent users, who benefit the most, are initially authenti-
cated with PEPS-AKA and then re-authenticated with a
4G+FRP-based re-authentication mechanism for ‘n’ future
accesses.
Based on our previous research contributions, the number
of supported re-authentications ‘n’ can range from 4 – 8 [27].
Here, each visit of a user to a particular LTE access network
is counted, and the user is given fast network access during
subsequent visits to the previously visited access networks.
To determine whether an LTE user is a frequent visitor of a
network, an access frequency threshold Th(F,t) and a network
visit counter Ct(V,t) are maintained over time [0,t] for every
LTE user.
With the user’s first visit to a network, Ct(V,t) is initialized
to ‘1’, and with every successive visit to the same network,
the value of Ct(V,t) is incremented. At time ‘t’, for any LTE
user, if Ct(V,t) equals Th(F,t), then that particular user is rec-
ognized as a frequent visitor. Th(F,t) is some upper bound
value, and if this value is kept low, it can serve a wider subset
of the LTE and PS-LTE population. The Re-authentication
Vector Counter (RVCtr) for every frequent visitor denotes
the number of successful re-authentications among ‘n’ avail-
able re-authentications; RVCtr can take values up to ‘n’.
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FIGURE 4. PEPS-AKA message exchange.
The PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP authentication procedures are
detailed in the following sections.
A. INITIAL AUTHENTICATION WITH PEPS-AKA
The message flow of the PEPS-AKA protocol is shown
in Figure 4, and the steps involved in the PEPS-AKA-based
authentication procedure are summarized as follows.
1. Initially, for a new user, when a UE attempts to connect
with an LTE network, a confidentiality- and integrity-
protected Attach Request is sent from the UE to the
MME through an eNB with the IMSI, security capa-
bility and Key Selection Identifier (KSIASME) = 7.
The Initial Attach Request message in addition contains
an unconcealed and integrity protected dummy IMSI
related to the users’ IMSI to support user identification
at the network side. The dummy IMSI is pre-shared
using the USIM/UICC along with the secret K at UE
and HSS. For known and frequent users, the Globally
Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI) is used instead
of the IMSI. KSIASME is a 3-bit value ranging from
0 (‘‘000’’) to 7 (‘‘111’’), where KSIASME = 7 indicates
that the UE has no authentication key, which triggers the
PEPS-AKA procedure.
2. The MME receives the Attach Request and sends
an Authentication Data Request message, along with
the Serving Network Identifier (SN-ID) and Network
Type (NT), to the HSS and requests an Authentication
Vector (AV) for the UE.
3. Upon receiving the Authentication Data Request,
the HSS verifies the SN-ID, and if it is found to be
FIGURE 5. Cryptographic key material generation.
genuine, the HSS retrieves the UE’s secret key (LTE K)
from its database and generates a single AV. The AV is
generated as shown in Figure 5 and sent to the MME
along with the security key (K0) in the Authentication
Data Response message. During the PEPS-AKA pro-
cess, K0 and AV are generated from the static LTE K,
and once a user has been acknowledged as a frequent
user, K0 and AV are generated from the dynamic LTEK.
The 128 least significant bits of K0 are reserved for
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confidentiality protection, and the 128 most significant
bits are reserved for integrity protection. The AV is com-
posed of four parameters: a random number (RAND),
expected response (XRES), KASME and authentication
token (AUTN). Where ‘f 1 − f 5’ shown in Figure 5,
are the one-way hashing functions used to support AV
generation. The sequence number (SQN) is generated
by the HSS, and it is incremented by one for every
round. Anonymity Key (AK) that is used to encrypt
the SQN to ensure UE privacy protection when any
eavesdropper tries to associate different executions of
the authentication protocol with consecutive SQNs with
the same mobile user. The Authentication Management
Field (AMF) is configured in USIM and the opera-
tor’s database in AuC. Thus, AUTN is computed as
((SQN XOR AK)||AMF||MAC).
4. The MME sends the confidentiality- and integrity-
protected Authentication Request with its MME-ID,
RAND, AUTN of HSS, Function Identifier Sequence
(FnId_Seq) and KSIASME to the UE. FnId_Seq is an
optional parameter and is sent only for known and
frequent users. KSIASME is used by the UE to gen-
erate a KASME value that is identical to that of the
HSS. For every initial UE-HSS association, the secret
LTE K is used, which is a predefined static key that
is stored in the UE and HSS as a factory setting. For
every successive association, a new Pseudo Random
Function (PRF) is used to generate a dynamic LTE K
to leverage the LTE security. Therefore, the initial PRF
identifier in the FnId_Seq parameter always denotes
the PRF ‘f 0’ to generate the dynamic LTE K, and the
rest of FnId_Seq contains the set of PRF identifiers to
support 4G+FRP re-authentication key generation. For
4G+RAM execution between a single UE-MME pair,
the dynamic LTE K varies and increases the overall
security level. TheMME stores FnId_Seq locally to sup-
port re-authentication. The dynamic LTE K generation
using ‘f 0’ is further explained in Section V-B.
5. On the user side, the network authentication is per-
formedwith AUTNvalidation. If the network is found to
be genuine, the Authentication Response (RES) is sent
to the MME.
6. The MME validates the RES of the UE with the XRES
in the AV received from the HSS. If the RES and
XRES match, the UE is considered to be genuine. Thus,
the MME authenticates the UE and an Authentication
Success message is sent from the MME to the UE.
After a successful mutual authentication, the KASME gen-
erated by the HSS will also be generated by the UE, which is
a top-level key (also known as an anchor key) that is used to
secure LTE communication. Post PEPS-AKA authentication,
the non-access stratum security mode command procedure
and access stratum command procedures follow procedures
that are similar to those of the existing LTE system.
The idea behind the proposed 4G+FRP is to use theKASME
generated during the initial PEPS-AKA authentication as a
seed for the predefined PRF according to the shared FnId_Seq
to support Re-authentication KASME (r-KASME) generation at
the UE and MME for a successful re-authentication.
The AES-based secure message authentication algorithm
EEA2 is used for confidentiality protection, and EIA2 is
used for integrity protection. EIA2 uses AES as the under-
lying cipher and CMAC as the MAC structure, which is
extensively analyzed and proven to be secure. The PRF ‘f6’
is pre-shared and stored with the LTE K as the factory
settings.
B. RE-AUTHENTICATION WITH 4G+FRP
The re-authentication process involves a single round-trip-
time authentication, which is described as follows.
4G+FRP:
UE→MME (Attach Request):
(GUTIUE, R-Id, RVCtr, r-KASME)KR , (GUTIUE,
R-Id, Fn-Id, RVCtr, r-KASME)EIA2, T
MME→UE (Attach Response):
Re-authentication Success/Failure
1. The UE sends an Attach Request, with a re-
authentication vector to the MME (through an eNB)
during re-authentication. The re-authentication vec-
tor consists of a cipher- and integrity-protected
GUTI, Re-authentication Identifier (R-Id), RVCtr, Re-
authentication Key (r-KASME) and Timestamp (T).
‘T’ ensures the freshness of the message. R-Id is gen-
erated by both UE and MME, and it is unique to each
UE and eNB pair. R-Id is generated by truncating
the KASME value that is generated during the initial
PEPS-AKA authentication. RVCtr denotes the num-
ber of re-authentications being carried out for a
known or frequent visitor. To generate r-KASME, the UE
initially fetches an Fn-Id that corresponds to RVCtr from
the pre-shared FnId_Seq. The Fn-Id uniquely identifies
a PRF in the order of the received FnId_Seq. A PRF
table has a set of PRFs along with the received FnId_Seq
and corresponding user R-Id that is maintained for
every UE and eNB pair. The security key KR and
r-KASME generation shown in Figure 6(a)and 6(b) are
pre-processes at the UE to send the attach request to
the MME. The 128 least significant bits of KR are
reserved for confidentiality protection, and the 128most
significant bits are reserved for integrity protection of
the 4G+FRP message exchanges.
2. Upon receipt of an Attach Request, the MME com-
putes the corresponding KR and r-KASME based
on the received R-Id, RVCtr from the pre-shared
FnId_Seq. If the r-KASME computed by the MME
matches the received r-KASME, then a Re-authentication
Success message is sent in the Attach Response to
the UE.
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FIGURE 6. (a) Re-authentication message confidentiality and integrity
protection key generation. (b) Re-authentication key generation.
For every re-authentication following an initial
PEPS-AKA authentication KASME is used as a seed to gener-
ate the r-KASME key. In contrast, for every re-authentication
following a re-authentication; i.e., nth re-authentication fol-
lowing an (n-1)th re-authentication, r-KASME-n−1 is used as
the seed to generate the r-KASME−n key. A set of PRFs is
used as the key generation function. The PRF sequence used
to generate subsequent r_KASME is pre-shared during the
PEPS-AKA initial authentication phase.
Here, prfx is a PRF, taken from a PRF set or
sequence (‘‘prf0’’, prf1, prf2 . . . prfx , prfx+1....prfn), where
prf0 is defined for two special purposes as (i) prf0 is assigned
as ‘f 0’ as shown in Figure 5 and that is used for dynamic LTE
K generation, with the static LTE K as the seed after a normal
authentication phase and the previously generated dynamic
LTE K as the seed for the key hierarchy after a known
authentication phase; and (ii) prf0 is used for encryption
key (KR) derivation during re-authentication with K0 as the
seed. The remaining PRFs, from prf1 to prfn, are used in
the order specified in FnId_Seq to derive the subsequent re-
authentication keys (r-KASME).
A PRF that has been used once is not reused for r-KASME
generation during a 4G+RAM cycle. Hence, the r-KASME is
unique for a UE-eNB pair in its 4G+RAM duration. Addi-
tionally, as Fn-Id is not transmitted during the authentication
request, r-KASME is highly secure. The various 4G+FRP
parameters, alongwith their bit sizes, are presented in Table 1.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION
AVISPA is used with Security Protocol ANimator (SPAN)
to validate the security properties of various 3G and 4G
TABLE 1. Parameters and bit sizes of the re-authentication vector.
security protocols that were discussed in recent research
works [28], [29]. As AVISPA provides a high level of assur-
ance to both developers and users of next-generation secu-
rity protocols, the proposed PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP are
validated using the AVISPA tool. The proposed protocols
are modeled with the High-Level Protocol Specification Lan-
guage (HLPSL). The HLPSL models the communicating
entities UE, MME and HSS in different roles and speci-
fies their behaviors with defined state machines [30]. Every
protocol’s HLPSL is composed of sections such as the
role, session, goal and environment. The goal encompasses
the authentication and secrecy goal of the protocols. The
Dolev-Yao intruder model is set up to validate the resistance
of PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP to various intruder attacks.
Before this, the Dolev-Yao model is given knowledge about
various sessions in the protocol. With the gained intruder
knowledge, the Dolev-Yao model attempts to analyze, inter-
cept, inject and modify the exact message exchanges by
impersonating a legitimate user [31].
All message exchanges in the proposed PEPS-AKA and
4G+FRP are encrypted with security keys K0 and KR using
the EEA2 encryption algorithm and integrity protected with
the EIA2 integrity algorithm, respectively. The goal sections
of PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP verify the secrecy of keys
K0 and KR during the authentication and re-authentication
intruder simulations, respectively, under theDolev-Yao attack
model. It also verifies the authentication goal betweenUE and
HSS in PEPS-AKA and authentication goal between UE and
MME in 4G+FRP. The intruder simulations of PEPS-AKA
and 4G+FRP are shown in Figures 7 and 8, respectively.
The corresponding outputs from the back-end servers
On-the-Fly Model Checker (OFMC), SAT-based Model
Checker (SATMC) and Constrained Logic-based Attack
Searcher (CL-AtSe) indicate that our proposed PEPS-AKA
and 4G+FRP are safe under intruders’ security attacks and
satisfy the specified security goals. The sample output from
the OFMC back-end server is shown in Figure 9. The related
state-space tree construction by the OFMC [32] and the depth
of attack analysis are shown in term of visited nodes and plies
respectively.
B. BANDWIDTH CONSUMPTION ANALYSIS
This section defines the fluid-flow mobility model for the
LTE system to determine the UE network boundary crossing
rate and dwell time within a given LTE access network where
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FIGURE 7. PEPS-AKA intruder simulation.
FIGURE 8. 4G+FRP intruder simulation.
the PEPS-AKA mechanism is triggered. The authentication
overhead of PEPS-AKA and its bandwidth consumption are
analyzed using the defined fluid-flow mobility model. The
model describes the amount of data flow out from the LTE
access region, which is directly proportional to the density
of the mobile user population within the LTE access region,
the average speed of a mobile user with respect to the direc-
tion (v), and the length (L) of the registration area boundary.
It is assumed that the directions of movement of the mobile
users are uniformly distributed over [0,2pi ], and the mobile
users are uniformly populated with a density of ρ. Therefore,
the rate of registration area crossing by any mobile user is
given by
RLTE = ρvL
pi
(1)
When the fluid-flow mobility model is considered to ana-
lyze the PEPS-AKA authentication bandwidth consumption,
various assumptions, which are presented in Table 2, are
suggested by various research works, such as [25] and [33].
Based on the assumptions shown in Table 2 and equa-
tion (1), the rate of mobile UEs (arrival rate of UEs for
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FIGURE 9. PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP security results reported by OFMC.
TABLE 2. Parameters involved in bandwidth consumption analysis.
registration per access region) crossing an access region can
be computed as equation (2).
R_LTE = (30.3km× 5.6km/s× 390units/sq.km)
3600pi
= 5.85 UEs/s. (2)
The computed registration rate is equal to the de-
registration rate. Therefore, the number of users requesting
access to the network per second is equivalent to the number
of authentication requests for registration per second, and it
is calculated as
RAuth = R_LTE
∗Number of registration area in a serving network
= 5.85 users/sec∗128 = 748.8 users/s, (3)
where RAuth is the arrival rate of mobile users at an LTE
access network for registration following an authentication.
Therefore, the MME should be able to manage the processes
of authentication and location area updating for 749 mobile
users/s. As with all conventional authentication mechanisms,
the MME, along with the HSS, takes over the entire authen-
tication and key management process. Therefore, there is a
huge threat to the MME and HSS/AuC due to computational
overhead.
The bandwidth consumption of PEPS-AKA can be com-
puted from the authentication request arrival rate (RAuth).
Based on the rate of authentication request arrival and the
authentication parameters given in Table 3, the total authen-
tication bandwidth consumption (Total_BWAuth) can be
calculated as shown in (4).
Total_BWAuth = Authentication Message Size
∗No. of Authentication Request/s (4)
To evaluate the optimal performance of the proposed
PEPS-AKA protocol, computing the bandwidth utilization
between the serving MME and HSS is sufficient. The HSS
overhead and authentication delay are mainly due to excess
message exchange between the MME and HSS. The size of a
message exchanged between the MME and HSS in the con-
ventional authentication mechanism is the sum of the sizes
of the messages sent during AV request and AV reception.
The bit sizes of the authentication parameters for message
computation of SE-AKA and Enhanced AKA are taken from
their corresponding research works [25], [34]. In previous
works, it was proven that SE-AKA outperforms various other
LTE authentication schemes, such as EPS-AKA, DEX-AKA,
EAP-AKA, AP-AKA, X-AKA, Cocktail AKA, S-AKA and
G-AKA [34], [35]. Therefore, the comparison of PEPS-
AKA is limited to recently proposed and accepted research
works, such as Enhanced AKA and SE-AKA. In conventional
authentication schemes [25], [34], the size of amessage trans-
mitted between the MME and HSS is calculated as follows.
Message size of SE-AKA
= SNID+IMSI+[AV (RAND+XRES+AUTN+KASME )∗n]
= 48+ 64+ [(128+ 32+ 128+ 256)∗5]
= 48+ 64+ 2720 = 2832 bits (5)
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TABLE 3. PEPS-AKA parameters and bit sizes.
Total_BWAuth_SE-AKA
= 2832 bits× 748.8/s
= 2.022 Mbits/s (6)
Message size of Enhanced-AKA
= 2∗SNID+ 2∗KI + IMSI +M -ID+ RANDUE + S
= 2∗48+ 2∗128+ 128+ 60+ 128+ 128
= 796 bits (7)
Total_BWAuth_Enhanced AKA
= 796 bits∗748.8/s
= 0.568 Mbits/s (8)
During the initial authentication, except for the difference
in bit size of messages transmitted between the UE, MME
and HSS, the number of rounds for requesting AV is similar
in existing schemes and the proposed PEPS-AKA. Here,
we consider the size of the authentication message exchanged
between the MME and HSS to evaluate the bandwidth con-
sumption and HSS load. Therefore, the message size of the
proposed PEPS-AKA between the MME and HSS is equal
to the total number of authentication requests and response
message exchanges.
Size of PEPS-AKA message
= IMSI + SN -ID+ NT +MAC + AV
× (RAND+ AUTN + XRES + KASME )
= 64+ 28+ 4+ 128+ 128+ 128+ 32+ 256
= 768 bits (9)
Total_BWAuth_PEPS-AKA
= 768 bits∗748.8/s
= 575078.4 bits/sec
= 0.548 Mbits/s (10)
As discussed in Section IV, 4G+RAM is a combination of
PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP. Therefore, the 4G+RAM authen-
tication signaling overheads at the HSS for different authenti-
cation arrival rates are comparatively analyzed with those of
existing schemes, such as SE-AKA and Enhanced EPS-AKA
in Figures 10 and 11.
The existing schemes fetch ‘n’ AVs from the HSS, whereas
the proposed PEPS-AKA fetches only a single AV from the
FIGURE 10. Comparison of HSS loads during initial authentication.
FIGURE 11. Comparison of HSS Loads during Session / Re-authentication.
HSS. Meanwhile, the MME sends the required FnId_Seq to
the UE to support ‘n’ future accesses and the generation of the
corresponding re-authentication vectors; therefore, the HSS
load is veryminimal and is balanced in 4G+RAMauthentica-
tion and re-authentication compared to the existing schemes.
Therefore, both the known- and frequent-user authenti-
cation processes of the proposed 4G+RAM greatly reduce
the HSS and AuC overhead. This minimum re-authentication
signaling renders fast access for LTE and critical PS-LTE
users. No AVs for future access are generated during the ini-
tial authentication, but the required re-authentication vector
is generated as and when required, without any delay at the
MME itself; this eliminates the AV synchronization problem.
1) INITIAL AUTHENTICATION FOR A NEW USER
To demonstrate the optimal performance of PEPS-AKA,
a comparative analysis based on the entire authentication
bandwidth consumption is performed. The authentication
overheads of PEPS-AKA, Enhanced AKA, and SE-AKA are
computed in (11), (12), and (13) as follows.
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m1: Attach request sent from UE to MME
m2: Authentication data / AV request from MME to HSS
m3: AV data response sent from HSS to MME
m4: Authentication request along with FnId_Seq sent
from MME to UE.
m5: Authentication response sent from UE to MME
Bandwidth for PEPS-AKA=
∏5
i=1M (i)
∗748.8/s (11)
m1 = IMSI + KSIASME + SEC-Capability+MAC
m2 = IMSI + SN -ID+ NT
m3 = AV (RAND,AUTN ,XRES,KASME )
m4 = MME-ID,RAND,AUTNHSS ,KASME ,
FnId_Seq,MAC
m5 = RES
Bandwidth for Enhanced AKA=
∏5
i=1M (i)
∗748.8/s
(12)
m1 = SNID+ KI + IMSI +M-ID+ RANDUE
m2 = 2∗SNID+ KI + IMSI +M-ID+ RANDUE
m3 = KI + S
m4 = KI + RANDMME + AUTH
m5 = RES
Based on the assumptions of the fluid-flow model given
in Table 2, a serving network consists of 128 registration
areas. According to the SE-AKA scheme [34], each reg-
istration area is considered as a group, where one UE in
each group is assumed to perform full authentication, rep-
resenting all group members, whereas the other UEs may
send or receive m1, m5, m4, etc. Each group (G) is assigned
a group number ‘j’. The SE-AKA bandwidth is calculated as
follows.
Bandwidth for SE-AKA
= 128/sec∗
∏5
i=1 m (i)
+ (748.8−128) ∗(m1+ m4+ m5−MACGj−TGj) (13)
m1 = IDGj + TIDME + RME +MACGj + TGj
m2 = IDGj + TIDME + RME +MACGj + TGj + LAI
m3 = RHSS+RME+AMF+748.8/128(SVME+TIDME )
m4 = IDMME + IDGj + TIDME +MACMME + RHSS
+RMME + RME + AMF + aP
m5 = MACME + bP
2) AUTHENTICATION AND RE-AUTHENTICATION FOR
KNOWN AND FREQUENT USERS
Once the UE is registered, in both Enhanced-AKA and
SE-AKA, the AV is made available in the serving network;
hence, the HSS is not involved in fetching the AV. However,
this AV availability at the UE side and the MME side will
result in a huge security loophole when the UE is com-
promised. In turn, according to the proposed authentica-
tion model, in both the proposed PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP,
the AVs and re-authentication vectors are generated as and
when required on the go by fetching from the HSS and
with the pre-shared FnId_Seq at the MME, respectively.
Therefore, the HSS involvement is reduced to a great extent.
The bandwidth consumptions of PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP
are computed based on the authentication request arrival
rate [36]. As mentioned in previous research, the authen-
tication request arrival rate in an intra-domain handover is
expressed as
λ1 =
4∑
r=1
λu Pr
([
Na
]− 1) (14)
where λu, is the call arrival rate, Pr is the probability that a UE
initiates a network access, and the connection lasts until a UE
moves out of the current access domain. N a is the average
number of access areas passed by a UE. When the UE call
arrival rate λu follows a Poisson distribution, then the average
number of intra-domain handover authentications is [N a]−1.
Let λ2 be the rate of arrival of session authentications. It is
the same as the UE call arrival rate [36]. Therefore, λ2 = λu.
The bandwidth consumption for PEPS-AKA and enhanced
AKA are computed as
BW_PEPS-AKA = (λ1+ λ2)∗(m1+ m4+ m5) (15)
The bandwidth consumption for 4G+FRP is computed as
BW_4G+ FRP = ((λ1+ λ2)∗(m1’+ m2’) (16)
where,
m1’: Authentication request from UE to MME
m2’: Authentication request from MME to UE
The bandwidth consumption for SE-AKA is computed as
BW_SE-AKA = (λ1+ λ2)∗(m1+ m4+ m5)− (λ1+ λ2)
∗(MACGj + TGj) (17)
Using the bandwidth consumptions of various protocols,
calculated from (15)-(17), and the authentication arrival
rate in an access network, as given in (14), a comparison
among the authentication arrival rates and the correspond-
ing bandwidth consumptions for PEPS-AKA, 4G+FRP,
Enhanced-AKA, and SE-AKA is performed as depicted
in Figures 12 and 13. As in [25] and [36], a few assumptions
are made: λu = 8.7/sec/registration area, Pr = 1 and
N a = 10.
VII. DISCUSSION ON SECURITY FEATURES
A. USER PRIVACY PROTECTION
The authentication requests and responses in PEPS-AKA and
4G+FRP are encrypted, and the IMSI is sent only during the
initial authentication. During every re-authentication, instead
of the IMSI, the GUTI is sent in the access request. There-
fore, as the rate of on-the-air IMSI transmission decreases
and every attach request message containing the IMSI is
encrypted and integrity-protected, the possibility of IMSI
tampering, user tracking, or user information acquisition
becomes negligible.
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FIGURE 12. Comparison of bandwidth consumption for initial
authentication.
FIGURE 13. Comparison of bandwidth consumption for session /
handover authentication.
B. SECURITY AGAINST MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
To perform a successful man-in-the-middle attack, an
intruder needs to tamper with the IMSI of a legitimate user.
With the IMSI of any legitimate user, the intruder can send
an attach request message to receive the valid AV from the
HSS. However, in PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP, the IMSI cannot
be fetched at any level, as the IMSI transmitted during the
authentication process is confidentiality and integrity pro-
tected. Moreover, during every re-authentication, the GUTI is
sent as the UE identifier instead of the IMSI, so a man-in-the-
middle attack is not feasible. Additionally, the IMSI cannot
be cached or tampered with when using any IMSI catching
device.
C. RESISTANCE TO RE-DIRECTION ATTACK
During the initial authentication, on receiving the attach
request message, only the MME sends the SN-ID in an
authentication data request to the HSS. As both the MME
and HSS reside in the secured backhaul connection network,
tampering is not possible at this stage. Moreover, the intruder
can impersonate only a genuine eNB to perform a re-direction
attack. As an eNB does not initiate any attach request in the
PEPS-AKA process, a fake eNB cannot modify the SN-ID.
Additionally, during the 4G+FRP process, re-authentication
is initiated only with trusted and previously authenticated
genuine eNBs, and no new eNB can initiate 4G+FRP. There-
fore, a re-direction attack is not feasible.
D. SOLUTION TO THE SINGLE-KEY PROBLEM
The pre-shared static LTE K in the UE and HSS is the source
key for deriving all subsequent key materials in the LTE
network. If the static LTE K is compromised, then all
other keys can be retrieved. Taking this into consideration,
in 4G+RAM, the static LTE K is used only once during
the very first initial authentication, and for every successive
access dynamic, LTE K is used to generate the entire LTE
key hierarchy. Thus, the single-key problem is addressed
effectively.
E. SECURITY AGAINST RE-PLAY ATTACK
The entire communication between any UE and MME is
protected with the anchor key, KASME. It is dynamically gen-
erated with a different set of PRFs, so no cached KASME can
be re-used for future communication. Every attach request
corresponding to the re-authentication contains a timestamp
value, which ensures the freshness of the message and pre-
vents replay attempts.
F. DE-SYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK
The single AV generation in PEPS-AKA prevents the
interleaving usage of AV which in turn avoids the de-
synchronization attack. Moreover, this type of attack inMME
prevents the timeliness of handover key management. It is a
potential security flaw when the intruder compromises any
security key. The proposed 4G+RAM uses the KASME that
was previously generated to derive r-KASME with a different
PRF, and if any authentication failure occurs, the secret LTE
K is used to re-initiate the authentication with PEPS-AKA.
Additionally, during the re-authentication phase, if any net-
work error occurs, the UE can re-initiate a 4G+FRP-based
re-authentication with the unused set of Fn-IDs in the order
specified by the received FnId_Seq. Therefore, no communi-
cation failure occurs at any level.
G. SIGNALING OVERHEAD OPTIMIZATION
During every initial authentication, a single AV is fetched,
instead of ‘n’ AVs, from the HSS, and HSS involvement in
the re-authentication process is completely eluded. These two
enhancements reduce the signaling overhead and bandwidth
consumption in the LTE access network significantly.
H. PERFECT FORWARD AND BACKWARD SECRECY
Dynamic LTE K-based key generation ensures perfect for-
ward and backward secrecy without imposing any overhead
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on the existing system. Moreover, the PRFs used to generate
KASME are not logically related or dependent. Therefore,
if any authentication key is obtained, the previous keys and
successive keys cannot be derived at any level, so all past and
future communications are made safe.
I. DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK
The hackers execute Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack by
cloning the legitimate UEs’ identification information (IMSI)
to send multiple attach request messages to the LTE access
network simultaneously alongwith the legitimate UEs’ attach
request message. Where the MME will be overwhelmed by
this kind of DoS attack and the legitimate UE’s attach request
will be denied. The LTEEPS-AKA is prone to DoS attack due
to lack of confidentiality protection and integrity protection.
Whereas the proposed 4G+RAM is resistant towards DoS as
both PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP carrying subscriber identifi-
cation information are confidentiality and integrity protected.
J. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK
Using a technique similar to botnets that attacks websites
to achieve distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, it is
also possible for the hackers to overwhelm the LTE cellular
networks to shut it down. To execute a successful DDoS
attack, the hackers need to clone the subscriber identifica-
tion information (IMSI/GUTI) from SIM cards/USIM from
thousands of UEs and then make multiple roaming calls
from different geographical locations with different handsets.
DDoS in LTE will deliberately confuse the network with a
mobile number that appears to be in thousands of places at
once. But, the subscriber identification information in the
proposed 4G+RAM will not be available to hackers as all
the message exchange during PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP are
confidentiality and integrity protected.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ever-growing mobile broadband network requires
improved LTE support, which impacts every aspect of day-
to-day life. LTE, as the key driver for 5G, needs signifi-
cant research contributions to fix its security loopholes and
reduce its signaling overhead. 4G+RAM is proposed as a
solution to address the existing issues of the LTE system
and make it a better information and communication tech-
nology ecosystem and to suit the growing demands of the
next-generation 5G and critical PS systems. The entire
authentication and re-authentication procedures involved in
the proposed 4G+RAM are confidentiality- and integrity-
protected with dynamic LTE K and thus overcome the
critical security vulnerabilities of the LTE system, such
as user tracking based on IMSI, redirection, and AV
de-synchronization, and preventing man-in-the-middle and
denial-of-service attacks. 4G+RAM minimizes the access
latency, as the proposed PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP involve
minimal authentication signaling compared to other recent
methods. This makes LTE the most suitable network
for critical PS communications. However, proving latency
improvement in terms of authentication time is outside the
scope of this paper.Moreover, 4G+FRP offers fast and secure
network access to known and frequents users and thus pro-
vides better QoS to a wide group of mobile users. The HSS
is not involved in re-authentication; as a result, the HSS
load is reduced. Additionally, the PEPS-AKA and 4G+FRP
schemes are proven safe using the formal verification tool
AVISPA. Thus, the proposed 4G+RAM with PEPS-AKA
and 4G+FRP ensures privacy protection and seamless, secure
communication in LTE and LTE-dependent future-generation
PS networks.
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